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Abstract. Valuation ultimately refers to the contribution of an item to meeting a specific goal or
objective. Conventional economic valuation is based on the goal of allocative efficiency. But other
social goals may be equally, if not more, important. For example, the goals of social fairness and
ecological sustainability have been identified as being at least of the same level of importance as
allocative efficiency. This paper looks at the role of social goals in determining the basis for valuation
of natural capital and ecosystem services, and sketches the characteristics of a system of valuation
that would give equal weight to all three of the major social goals mentioned above. It also places
these goals within a more comprehensive conceptual model of the economy and its relationship to
the ecological life support system in which it is embedded.
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1. Introduction
Natural capital and the ecosystem services, which flow from it, are obviously im-
portant in sustaining human life on earth (Daily, 1997; Costanza et al., 1997a).
The big questions include: how important? Over what temporal and spatial scales?
What are the limits of humanity’s ability to substitute for them? At what levels
of stress do they flip to some other (less desirable) state? All of these questions
require the ability to understand and model the interconnected, co-evolving system
of humans and nature (Costanza et al., 1993, 1997b). In addition, the answers to
these questions are not purely academic. We humans have to make choices and
tradeoffs concerning ecosystem services and this implies and requires ‘valuation’,
because any choice between competing alternatives implies that the one chosen
was more highly ‘valued’. That the alternatives are ‘competing’ is important, since
if we can find a ‘win-win’ solution then no real choice is required and we can
avoid valuation. But most environmental decisions involve the problem of having
to weigh and aggregate the myriad different kinds of ‘benefits’ of a proposed action
against its ‘costs’. In most cases these benefits and costs are both poorly understood
and poorly quantified. In addition, the future vision and social goals that define
the degree to which something is a benefit or a cost are themselves evolving and
changing. In doing valuation of ecosystem services we need to consider a broader
set of goals that include ecological sustainability and social fairness, along with the
traditional economic goal of efficiency.
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2. Visions of the Economy and its Relationship to the Ecological Life
Support System
Joseph Schumpeter (1954) emphasized the importance of a ‘pre-analytic vision’ of
the world and its major problems. He noted that ‘vision of this kind not only must
precede historically the emergence of analytic effort in any field, but also may
reenter the history of every established science each time somebody teaches us to
see things in a light of which the source is not to be found in the facts, methods,
and results of the preexisting state of the science’ (Schumpeter, 1954, p. 41).
Our ‘pre-analytic vision’ is changing in many important respects. The evolution
of the human economy has passed from an era in which human-made capital was
the limiting factor in economic development to the current era in which remaining
natural capital has become the limiting factor. Basic economic logic tells us that we
should maximize the productivity of the scarcest (limiting) factor, as well as try to
increase its supply. This means that economic policy should be designed to increase
the productivity of natural capital and its total amount, rather than to increase the
productivity of human-made capital and its accumulation, as was appropriate in the
past when it was limiting. This implies a very different vision of the economy and
its place in the overall system.
Figure 1a shows the conventional economic pre-analytic vision. The primary
factors of production (land, labor, and capital) combine in the economic process
to produce goods and services (usually measured as Gross National Product or
GNP). GNP is divided into consumption (which is the sole contributor to individual
utility and welfare) and investment (which goes into maintaining and increasing the
capital stocks). Preferences are fixed. In this model the primary factors are perfect
substitutes for each other so ‘land’ (including ecosystem services) can be almost
ignored, and the lines between all the forms of capital are fuzzy. Property rights are
usually simplified to either private or public and their distribution is usually taken
as fixed and given.
Figure 1b shows an alternative ‘ecological economics’ view of the process
(Ekins, 1992; Costanza et al., 1997b). Notice that the key elements of the con-
ventional view are still present, but more has been added and some priorities have
changed. There is limited substitutability between the basic forms of capital in
this model and their number has expanded to four. Their names have also changed
to better reflect their roles: (1) natural capital (formerly land) includes ecological
systems, mineral deposits and other aspects of the natural world; (2) human capital
(formerly labor) includes both the physical labor of humans and the know-how
stored in their brains; (3) manufactured capital includes all the machines and other
infrastructure of the human economy; and (4) social (or cultural) capital. Social
capital is a recent concept that includes the web of interpersonal connections, insti-
tutional arrangements, rules and norms that allow individual human interactions to
occur (Berkes and Folke, 1994). Property rights regimes in this model are complex
and flexible, spanning the range from individual to common to public property.
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Figure 1. Conventional economics model (a) and expanded ‘ecological economic’ model (b).
Natural capital captures solar energy and behaves as an autonomous complex sys-
tem and the model conforms to the basic laws of thermodynamics. Natural capital
contributes to the production of marketed economic goods and services, which af-
fect human welfare. It also produces ecological services and amenities that directly
contribute to human welfare without ever passing through markets. There is also
waste production by the economic process, which contributes negatively to human
welfare and has a negative impact on capital and ecological services. Preferences
are adapting and changing but basic human needs are constant. Human welfare is
a function of much more than the consumption of economic goods and services.
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These visions of the world are significantly different. As Ekins (1992) points
out: ‘It must be stressed that that the complexities and feedbacks of model 2 are
not simply glosses on model 1’s simpler portrayal of reality. They fundamentally
alter the perceived nature of that reality and in ignoring them conventional analysis
produces serious errors...’ (p. 151).
3. Valuation, Choice, and Uncertainty
The conventional vision or paradigm also assumes that tastes and preferences are
fixed and given and that the economic problem consists of optimally satisfying
those preferences. Tastes and preferences usually do not change rapidly and, in the
short run (i.e. 1–4 yr), this assumption makes sense. But preferences do change
over longer time frames and in fact there is an entire industry (advertising) devoted
to changing them. Sustainability is an inherently long-run problem and in the long-
run it does not make sense to assume tastes and preferences are fixed. This is a
very disturbing prospect for economists because it takes away the easy definition
of what is ‘optimal’. If tastes and preferences are fixed and given, then we can
adopt a stance of ‘consumer sovereignty’ and just give the people what they want.
We do not have to know or care why they want what they want, we just have to
satisfy their preferences as efficiently as possible. But if preferences are expected
to change over time and under the influence of education, advertising, changing
cultural assumptions, etc., we need a different criterion for what is ‘optimal’ and
we have to figure out how preferences change, how they relate to this new criterion,
and how they can or should be changed to satisfy the new criterion.
One alternative for this new criterion is sustainability itself, or more completely
sustainable scale (or size of the economic subsystem), fair distribution, and effi-
cient allocation (Daly, 1992). This criterion implies a two-tiered decision process
(Page, 1977; Daly and Cobb, 1989; Norton et al., 1998) of first coming to a social
consensus on a sustainable scale and fair distribution and, second, using both the
market and other institutions like education and advertising to implement these
social decisions. This might be called ‘community sovereignty’ as opposed to ‘con-
sumer sovereignty’. It makes most conventional economists very uncomfortable to
stray from consumer sovereignty because it eliminates the tidy view of economics
as simply optimally satisfying a fixed set of preferences and it opens a Pandora’s
box of possibilities for manipulating preferences. If tastes and preferences can
change, then who is going to decide how to change them? There is a real danger that
a totalitarian government might be employed to manipulate preferences to conform
to the desires of a select elite rather than the society as a whole.
Two points need to be kept in mind in this regard: (1) preferences are already
being manipulated every day; and (2) we can just as easily apply open democratic
principles to the problem as hidden or totalitarian principles in deciding how to
manipulate preferences. So the question becomes: do we want preferences to be
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manipulated unconsciously, either by a dictatorial government or by big business
acting through advertising? Or do we want to formulate preferences consciously
based on social dialogue and consensus with a higher goal in mind? Ethics is the
forging and revising of our existing preferences in the light of a higher goal. Taking
preferences as given would mean that the ethical problem has been solved once and
for all. Either way, this is an issue that can no longer be avoided, and one that can
best be handled using open democratic principles and innovative thinking.
4. Valuation of Ecosystem Services and Preferences
The issue of valuation is inseparable from the choices and decisions we have to
make about ecological systems. Some argue that valuation of ecosystems is either
impossible or unwise. For example some argue that we cannot place a value on
such ‘intangibles’ as human life, environmental aesthetics, or long-term ecological
benefits. But, in fact, we do so every day. When we set construction standards
for highways, bridges and the like, we value human life – acknowledged or not –
because spending more money on construction would save lives. Another often-
made argument is that we should protect ecosystems for purely moral or aesthetic
reasons, and we do not need valuations of ecosystems for this purpose. But there are
equally compelling moral arguments that may be in direct conflict with the moral
argument to protect ecosystems, such as the moral argument that no one should go
hungry. All we have done is to translate the valuation and decision problem into a
new set of dimensions and a new language of discourse, one that in some senses
makes the valuation and choice problem more difficult and less explicit.
So, while ecosystem valuation is certainly difficult, one choice we do not have
is whether or not to do it. Rather, the decisions we make, as a society, about ecosys-
tems imply valuations. We can choose to make these valuations explicit or not; we
can undertake them using the best available ecological science and understanding
or not; we can do them with an explicit acknowledgment of the huge uncertainties
involved or not; but as long as we are forced to make choices we are doing valu-
ation. The valuations are simply the relative weights we give to the various aspects
of the decision problem.
Society can make better choices about ecosystems if the valuation issue is made
as explicit as possible. This means taking advantage of the best information we
can muster and making uncertainties about valuations explicit too. It also means
developing new and better ways to make good decisions in the face of these un-
certainties. Ultimately, it means being explicit about our goals as a society, both in
the short-term and in the long-term, and understanding the complex relationships
between current activities and policies and their ability to achieve these goals.
This leads back to the role of individual preferences in determining value. If
individual preferences change (in response to education, advertising, peer pressure,
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etc.) then value cannot completely originate with preferences. Value ultimately
originates in the set of individual and social goals to which a society aspires.
5. Valuation and Social Goals
Valuation ultimately refers to the contribution of an item to meeting a specific goal
or objective. A baseball player is valuable to the extent he contributes to the goal of
the team’s winning. In ecology, a gene is valuable to the extent it contributes to the
survival of the individuals possessing it and their progeny. In conventional econom-
ics, a commodity is valuable to the extent it contributes to the goal of individual
welfare as assessed by willingness to pay. The point is that one cannot state a value
without stating the goal being served. Conventional economic value is based on the
goal of individual utility maximization. But other goals, and thus other values, are
possible. For example, if the goal is sustainability, one should assess value based
on the contribution to achieving that goal – in addition to value based on the goals
of individual utility maximization, social equity, or other goals that may be deemed
important. This broadening is particularly important if the goals are potentially in
conflict.
As briefly mentioned above, there are at least three broad goals which have
been identified as important to managing economic systems within the context of
the planet’s ecological life support system (Daly, 1992):
(1) assessing and insuring that the scale or magnitude of human activities within
the biosphere are ecologically sustainable;
(2) distributing resources and property rights fairly, both within the current gen-
eration of humans and between this and future generations, and also between
humans and other species; and
(3) efficiently allocating resources as constrained and defined by 1 and 2 above,
and including both marketed and non-marketed resources, especially ecosys-
tem services.
Several authors have discussed valuation of ecosystem services with respect to goal
3 above – allocative efficiency based on individual utility maximization (e.g. Farber
and Costanza, 1987; Mitchell and Carson, 1989; Costanza et al., 1989; Dixon and
Hufschmidt, 1990; Pearce, 1993; Goulder and Kennedy, 1997). We need to explore
more fully the implications of extending these concepts to include valuation with
respect to the other two goals of (1) ecological sustainability, and (2) distributional
fairness (Costanza and Folke, 1997). Basing valuation on current individual pref-
erences and utility maximization alone, as is done in conventional analysis, does
not necessarily lead to ecological sustainability or social fairness (Bishop, 1993).
A Kantian or intrinsic rights approach to valuation (c.f. Goulder and Kennedy,
1997) is one approach to goal 2, but it is important to recognize that the three goals
are not ‘either-or’ alternatives. While they are in some senses independent multiple
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TABLE I
Valuation of ecosystem services based on the three primary goals of efficiency, fairness, and
sustainability (Costanza and Folke, 1997)
Goal or Who Preference Level of Level of Specific
value basis votes Basis discussion scientific input methods
required required
Efficiency Homo Current Low Low Willingness
economius individual to pay
preferences
Fairness Homo Community High Medium Veil of
communicus preferences ignorance
Sustainability Homo Whole system Medium High Modeling with
naturalis preferences precaution
criteria (Arrow and Raynaud, 1986) they must all be satisfied in an integrated fash-
ion to allow human life to continue in a desirable way. Similarly, the valuations that
flow from these goals are not ‘either-or’ alternatives. Rather than an ‘utilitarian or
intrinsic rights’ dichotomy, we must integrate the three goals listed above and their
consequent valuations.
A two tiered approach that combines public discussion and consensus build-
ing on sustainability and equity goals at the community level with methods for
modifying both prices and preferences at the individual level to better reflect these
community goals may be necessary (Rawls, 1971; Norton, 1995; Norton et al.,
1998). Estimation of ecosystem values based on sustainability and fairness goals
requires treating preferences as endogenous and co-evolving with other ecological,
economic, and social variables.
6. Valuation with Sustainability, Fairness, and Efficiency as Goals
Thus, we can distinguish at least three types of value which are relevant to the
problem of valuing ecosystem services. These are laid out in Table I, according to
their corresponding goal or value basis. Efficiency based value (E-value) is based
on a model of human behavior sometimes referred to as ‘Homo economius’ – that
humans act independently, rationally and in their own self-interest. Value in this
context (E-value) is based on current individual preferences, which are assumed to
be fixed or given (Norton et al., 1998). No additional discussion or scientific input
is required to form these preferences (since they are assumed to already exist) and
value is simply people’s revealed willingness to pay for the good or service in
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question. The best estimate of what people are willing to pay is thought to be what
they would actually pay in a well-functioning market. For resources or services
for which there is no market (like many ecosystem services) a pseudo market
can sometimes be simulated with questionnaires that elicit individual’s contingent
valuation.
Fairness based value (F-value) would require that individuals vote their pref-
erences as a member of the community, not as individuals. This different species
(Homo communicus) would engage in much discussion with other members of
the community and come to consensus on the values that would be fair to all
members of the current and future community (including non-human species), in-
corporating scientific information about possible future consequences as necessary.
One method to implement this might be Rawls’ (1971) ‘veil of ignorance’, where
everyone votes as if they were operating with no knowledge of their own individual
status in current or future society.
Sustainability based value (S-value) would require an assessment of the contri-
bution to ecological sustainability of the item in question. The S-value of ecosystem
services is connected to their physical, chemical, and biological role in the long-
term functioning of the global system. Scientific information about the functioning
of the global system is thus critical in assessing S-value, and some discussion and
consensus building is also necessary. If it is accepted that all species, no matter
how seemingly uninteresting or lacking in immediate utility, have a role to play
in natural ecosystems (Naeem et al., 1994; Tilman and Downing, 1994; Holling
et al., 1995), estimates of ecosystem services may be derived from scientific stud-
ies of the role of ecosystems and their biota in the overall system, without direct
reference to current human preferences. Humans operate as Homo naturalis in this
context, expressing preferences as if they were representatives of the whole system.
Instead of being merely an expression of current individual preferences, S-value
becomes a system characteristic related to the item’s evolutionary contribution to
the survival of the linked ecological economic system. Using this perspective we
may be able to better estimate the values contributed by, say, maintenance of water
and atmospheric quality to long-term human well-being, including protecting the
opportunities of choice for future generations (Golley, 1994; Perrings, 1994). One
way to get at these values, would be to employ systems simulation models that
incorporated the major linkages in the system at the appropriate time and space
scales (Costanza et al., 1993; Bockstael et al., 1995; Voinov et al., 1999). To
account for the large uncertainties involved, these models would have to be used
in a precautionary way, looking for the range of possible values and erring on the
side of caution (Costanza and Perrings, 1990).
In order to fully integrate the three goals of ecological sustainability, social
fairness, and economic efficiency we also need a further step, which Sen (1995)
has described as ‘value formation through public discussion’. This can be seen as
the essence of real democracy. As Buchanan (1954, p. 120) put it: ‘The definition
of democracy as ‘government by discussion’ implies that individual values can and
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do change in the process of decision-making’. Limiting our valuations and social
decision making to the goal of economic efficiency based on fixed preferences
prevents the needed democratic discussion of values and options and leaves us
with only the ‘illusion of choice’ (Schmookler, 1993). So, rather than trying to
avoid the difficult questions raised by the valuation of ecological systems and ser-
vices, we need to acknowledge the broad range of goals being served as well as the
technical difficulties involved. We must get on with the process of value formation
and analysis in as participatory and democratic a way as possible, but one which
also takes advantage of the full range and depth of scientific information we have
accumulated on ecosystem functioning. This is not simply the application of the
conventional pre-analytic vision and analyses to a new problem, but will require
a new, more comprehensive, more integrated, pre-analytic vision and new, yet to
be developed, analyses that flow from it. This will be an enormously important
challenge for the next generation of economists and ecosystem scientists.
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